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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIFTH

AMENDMENT-COERCED

CONFES-

Loss-The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the loss of a driver's assistant
job held over two days is not a "substantial economic loss" and will
not render a confession elicited by a private employer at the threat
of discharge and at the request of police involuntary and inadmissable.
SION-STATE ACTION-

SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC

United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, Sanney v. Smith, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974).
In February 1966, Harry L. Sanney applied for a job with Reid
Petroleum Corporation. Normal interviewing procedure included a
polygraph test to which Sanney submitted. The interviewer, Bewick, learned during questioning that Sanney was a murder suspect
and had failed to tell the police he had in fact struck the victim.
Though Sanney was subsequently hired as a driver's assistant, Bewick informed the police of what Sanney had told him. At police
request, Bewick agreed to submit Sanney to a second polygraph test
in order to allow the police to electronically eavesdrop in the adjoining room. Bewick conditioned Sanney's continued employment on
his taking the second polygraph test, to which he submitted. During
that test he admitted hitting the victim with a 2 x 4 piece of wood.
On the basis of that confession, Sanney was arrested and indicted
for first degree manslaughter.'
After an unsuccessful challenge to his indictment on the basis of
the fourth and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution,'
1. United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
Sanney v. Smith, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974).
2. The state court granted Sanney's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
his admissions to Bewick were the product of an interrogation that infringed his fourth and
fifth amendment rights. But the appellate division reinstated his indictment on appeal,
ruling that his fourth amendment rights were not violated by the electronic transmission, nor
were his fifth amendment rights violated by the lack of Miranda warnings. People v. Sanney,
32 App. Div. 2d 737, 301 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1969). With the indictment reinstated,
Sanney pleaded guilty to a charge of assault in the first degree and was sentenced. Sanney
appealed his conviction, raising the same arguments as on his appeal of the indictment. The
appellate division affirmed the conviction without an opinion and denied leave to appeal to
the court of appeals. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justice Douglas dissenting. Sanney v. New York, 404 U.S. 978 (1971).
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Sanney pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of assault in the first
degree and was sentenced to a prison term. Sanney filed a petition
in the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The court
ruled that Sanney had not waived his right to object to the admission of his confession' but subsequently denied his petition on constitutional grounds. 4 Sanney filed this appeal to the Second Circuit.
On appeal, the central issue facing the Second Circuit was
whether the manner in which Sanney's confession was obtained
rendered it involuntary and thus inadmissible under the fifth
amendment proscription against self-incrimination. The court preliminarily decided that when the police requested Sanney's employer to administer a second polygraph test to Sanney and he
complied, he became a police agent and his conduct was state action. The confession was nevertheless found to be voluntary;5 the
threatened loss of a two-day old, menial job was too insubstantial
an economic loss to render Sanney's confession involuntary and
inadmissible.
Sanney's contention, that the state's use of threatened job loss to
obtain his confession rendered his confession involuntary and inadmissible as evidence, was based on a line of cases beginning with
Garrity v. New Jersey.' In that case, policemen were required by
3. United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 352 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1973). The
district court decided that Sanney's case was properly before it although, to raise the constitutional claim in the federal district court, the issue had to have been before the state courts
on a motion to suppress. The court decided that the state court's hearing on the motion to
dismiss the indictment was sufficient to satisfy this rule.
4. United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 364 F. Supp. 905 (W.D.N.Y. 1973). The
district court held that there was no government benefit conditioned on relinquishing a
constitutional right. Id. at 910. See text at note 19 infra, for the Second Circuit's disposition
of this issue. The court also held the confession was not involuntarily given; Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not apply since Sanney was not in custody; and there was
no unlawful search and seizure perpetrated by the eavesdropping. 364 F. Supp. at 911.
5. The court of appeals agreed with the district court's procedural holding that Sanney
had not waived his constitutional claims, 500 F.2d at 414, and that Miranda warnings were
not required since Sanney was not in custody when he was questioned by Bewick. Id. at 416.
The Miranda finding is substantiated by previous decisions. See cases cited at 500 F.2d at
416; People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967); Smith, The
Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?,25
S.C.L. REV. 699 (1974); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
The court decided that Sanney's fourth amendment rights were not violated, relying on
cases cited at 500 F.2d at 416. Since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), is not
retroactive, it is inapplicable to Sanney, as Sanney's polygraph test was given prior to that
decision. 500 F.2d at 416.
6. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Prior to this decision, the Court allowed job-related coercion
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statute7 to answer questions about illegal activity on threat of removal from office and with no grant of immunity from criminal
prosecution. The policemen answered the question put to them and,
on the basis of their admissions, were convicted of conspiracy to
obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The Supreme Court held
that the statements were not voluntary because they were coerced
by the threat of job loss and therefore could not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. In the companion case, Spevack v.
Klein,' the Court applied the Garrity principle to the case of a
lawyer disbarred for his refusal to produce incriminating financial
records and held that his refusal could not be grounds for disbarment.'
The Supreme Court narrowed the Garrity principle in Gardnerv.
Broderick' in which it held that answers could be compelled of
public employees if they were granted immunity from criminal prosecution. In that case, policemen were discharged by the city of New
York for their refusal to comply with the city charter" by signing
a waiver of immunity and answering the questions of a grand jury
investigating bribery and corruption. The Supreme Court held that
as long as the fruits of the interrogation could lead to a criminal
because it was believed necessary to determine fitness for a job. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S.
468 (1958) (Court upheld the State of New York's dismissal of a subway employee who refused
to answer questions about Communist party affiliations). But an employee could not be
discharged for a refusal to answer a federal committee's questions. Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (City of New York could not dismiss a college professor
for refusal to answer the questions of a congressional committee where there was no connection between his refusal and fitness for the job). But see Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,
362 U.S. 1 (1960) (dismissal after refusal to comply with a county statute requiring employees
to answer federal committee questions was upheld; the discharge was not arbitrary); Beilan
v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (Court upheld the dismissal of a schoolteacher
who refused to answer his superintendent's questions about Communist party activities, even
though he had just been called to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee
and had successfully asserted his fifth amendment privilege).
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:8117.2al, .2a2 (Supp. 1975).

8. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
9. This holding overruled Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). Justice Harlan dissented
in both Garrity and Spevack. He stated that the state's interest in maintaining the integrity
of the police was greater than the hazard to the policemen's constitutional privilege, 385 U.S.
at 500, and that the state's interest in regulating those in the professional status of lawyer
overrode the lawyer's constitutional right to remain silent. Id. at 520. See text at notes 32-36
infra, for a discussion of the state's interest.
10. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
11. New York City Charter § 1123.
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proceeding, the policemen could not be compelled to answer and
could not be discharged. If the state had granted immunity, however, the answers could have been compelled;" if the questions specifically and narrowly related to job performance, the fifth amendment could not bar their dismissal. 3 In the companion case,
Uniformed Sanitation Men Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Sanitation," the Court applied the same holding to public employees in the Department of Sanitation. 5
5 the Supreme Court took a step beyond
In Lefkowitz v. Turley,"
protecting purely public employees and extended the Garrityprinciple to architects who contract to do work for the state. A New York
statute 7 precludes awards of public contracts to any person who
refuses to testify without immunity concerning contracts with the
state. Two architects refused to testify before a grand jury investigating charges of conspiracy, bribery, and larceny. The Court noted
that since the loss of state contracts by an architect would be just
as catastrophic as the loss of a job by a public employee, the economic coercion by the state was just as real for both. 8
In the foregoing cases, the state itself was directly involved in the
interrogating and the sanctioning of the failure to answer incriminating questions. In Sanney a private employer, at the request of
12. 392 U.S. at 276.
13. Id. at 278. Since the Court concluded that the fruits of the grand jury investigation
could lead to a criminal prosecution, the privilege against self-incrimination was a bar to the
policeman's dismissal. The state could protect its interest as an employer but could not
infringe on the employee's rights when criminally prosecuting him.
14. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
15. The City of New York was investigating charges that employers were not charging
private cartmen proper fees or were diverting the fees that were paid to themselves. The same
statute at issue in Gardner,requiring city employees to answer questions and waive immunity
or be discharged, was at issue here. The Court concluded that the sanitation men could invoke
their fifth amendment privilege since New York intended to prosecute them criminally and
not just hold them to an accounting for their behavior on the jobs. Id. at 284.
Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred with the majority opinions in Gardner and
Sanitation Men. Harlan, speaking for both, was relieved that the Garrityand Spevack rules
were limited so that the states as employers could still investigate performance of employees.
Id. at 285.
16. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
17. N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW §§ 103-a, -b (McKinney Supp. 1975).
18. 414 U.S. at 83-84. The Court decided that the state's interest in protecting the integrity of public contracts did not override the architects' privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 78-79. Both the state's interest and the architects' right to remain silent could be
protected by allowing the state to require answers if the public contractor is granted immunity. Id. at 84-85.
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the police, interrogated his own employee. The controlling factor,
however, was neither the private status of the employee nor the
channeling of the threat through a private employer."9 Since the
state initiated the idea of a second polygraph test and the employer
complied, the court found that the employer was acting as an agent
for the state:2" "The State's involvement is no less real for having
been indirect and no less impermissible for having been concealed." 2 ' Rather, the decision turned on the court's determination
that the threat of discharge can render incriminating statements
involuntary only where the discharge would result in "substantial"
economic loss.2" Since Sanney had held his job for only two days and
was a "transient manual laborer," his loss was not deemed substantial enough to render his statement involuntary. 3
The dissent24 could not agree that Sanney's threatened loss was
not substantial.25 For a person who was marginally intelligent and
emotionally troubled, a driver's assistant job could be important.
The dissent would have held that the threat of losing the job coerced
19. 500 F.2d at 415. The district court had held that Garrity and Spevack did not apply
to this case since the state did not condition a government benefit on Sanney's relinquishing
a constitutional right. 364 F. Supp. at 910. The court of appeals relied on Lefkowitz to extend
the concept of state action to this case to include the conditioning by the state of a private
benefit on relinquishing a constitutional right. 500 F.2d at 415.
20. 500 F.2d at 415. That a private person can act for the state is not a totally new idea.
E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) a
private person may be civilly liable where there is a conspiracy between state officials and a
private person to deprive another of his constitutional rights).
Participation by private persons in police activity has also been discouraged in the search
and seizure area. People v. Fierro, 336 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1956) (motel
owner's re-entry at police request into a patron's room to take samples of drugs found there
on his own suspicion was state action and an illegal search and seizure); Moody v. United
States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1960) (witness's entry into defendant's apartment to take
items he claimed had been stolen from him coupled with the immediate transfer to a policeman standing in the hallway was an illegal search and seizure).
21. 500 F.2d at 415.
22. Id., citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973).
23. 500 F.2d at 415. The court seemed to rely on Sanney's transience in deciding that his
loss was not substantial, perhaps inferring that his transience would prevent him from
remaining long in any job. The court ignored other language in Lefkowitz, however: "A
significant infringement of constitutional rights cannot be justified by the speculative ability
of those affected to cover the damage." 414 U.S. at 84. Sanney's continued transience and
his ability to find another "menial" job were certainly speculative and should have been given
little weight.
24. The majority consisted of Circuit Judges Anderson and Mansfield; Circuit Judge
Feinberg dissented.
25. 500 F.2d at 417 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
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him into incriminating himself and that the confession was improperly received in evidence."
The majority and dissent thus differ as to the type and duration
of a job which could be the subject of economic coercion. The dissent
would have held that a two-day old, menial job would be sufficient.
Although the majority did not attempt to set the floor for substantiality of economic loss, it did refer to prior decisions as satisfying
that test. The loss of a public employee's job with pension rights and
seniority as threatened in Garrity, Gardner, and Sanitation Men,
the disbarment of a lawyer as in Spevack, or an architect's loss of a
public contract as in Lefkowitz, would be a substantial loss.27 Evidently, there must be some years of service, or perhaps pension
rights, seniority, or professional training, for the threat of loss to be
sufficiently coercive to render confessions inadmissible.
It is clear that at some point threatened economic loss would be
so insubstantial that its presence would not affect the voluntariness
of a person's actions. The question arises whether the Sanney court
correctly determined that the petitioner's threatened economic loss
was not sufficiently substantial. To answer that question, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions will be examined and an attempt will be made to understand the rationale behind the court's
decision.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits a state from
fixing a penalty or cost for the assertion or exercise of a constitutional right.2 The state may not deny a government benefit or privilege, 3 impose an economic cost or inconvenience," or afix a non26. Id.
27. 500 F.2d at 415.
28. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
H~Av. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U.
PA. L. Ray. 144 (1968).
29. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (a policeman can refuse to choose between
his public employment and the exercise of his right to remain silent); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (a woman cannot be made to choose between state unemployment compensation benefits and the free exercise of her religion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 518 (1958) (a
veteran exercising his freedom of association cannot be denied a tax exemption for his refusal
to take a loyalty oath); see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (one who seeks public
office need not take a religious oath that offends his freedom of religion).
30. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (the exercise of first amendment
rights of freedom of associaton and speech cannot be conditioned on the return of a postcard);
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (requiring a certificate of residence in lieu of a
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economic criminal penalty for the assertion of a constitutional
right.' An important element of the doctrine is the necessity of
making a choice between relinquishing a constitutional right and
paying the penalty or cost attached to its exercise. If the state does
put a person to such a hard choice, it effectively dilutes that person's constitutional protections. 2 Whether economic or tactical, a
hard choice is impermissible unless the penalty is directed at furthering a legitimate state interest and the state interest is found to
be overriding." It cannot be used simply to discourage the exercise
poll tax violates the twenty-fourth amendment and cannot be made a condition to voting in
a federal election); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (a flat license tax levied
on minor solicitations for religious purposes inhibits the exercise of freedom of religion).
If an economic cost or the loss of a government benefit is a condition to the assertion of a
right, a person is put to the choice of exercising the right and "paying for it" or relinquishing
the right. He must ask himself: Can I afford it? The Constitution does not limit rights to those
who can afford them-it guarantees them to all. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956).
31. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (the possibility of a death sentence
cannot be made to depend on whether a defendant chooses to exercise his right to a jury trial);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (a defendant who chooses to remain silent under
the fifth amendment cannot be penalized by a prosecutor's remarks to the jury); Smartt v.
Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967) (a state cannot delay probation for a year for a prisoner's
attempt to secure a writ of habeas corpus); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.
1960) (a longer sentence cannot be imposed on one who did not plead guilty and exercised
his right to a fair trial).
If the further restriction of liberty is the penalty for a right asserted in the criminal justice
system, the choice is no longer economic but tactical. The individual must gamble-and take
the penalty if he loses. The Constitution surely does not encourage making rights dependent
on a correct guess of the odds. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 639 (4th Cir. 1967).
32. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1967); Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d
636, 639 (4th Cir. 1967); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 144, 144 (1968).
33. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406-09 (1963). In the area of first amendment rights, economic costs and denial of
government benefits are usually the penalties. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The state interest in these cases must be compelling.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Because first amendment rights of free speech,
association, and religion are so basic, the state interest has frequently been overridden. E.g.,
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (when the petitioner's freedom of speech and
association was at issue, the Court would not even consider the right of Customs to inspect
material from abroad for contraband).
In the criminal justice system, there is a legitimate state interest in prosecuting crimes.
That interest, however, has not overridden the assertion of rights. When the state fixes a
penalty on asserting the right, its effect is to chill the exercise of that right. United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968). The need for protection of the accused does not permit a
hard choice to be made between a right and a penalty. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d
636 (4th Cir. 1967).
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of a right.34
The court may have engaged in an implicit cost-benefit analysis
to determine if Sanney had been put to such a choice. This is suggested by its categorization of Sanney as a "transient manual laborer who had been on the job for at most a couple of days." 5 In
the Garrity line of cases, the cost of remaining silent could be measured economically by lost wages plus the loss of valuable benefits
and pension rights. Against that cost was balanced the possibility
of criminal prosecution. The economic loss was great enough to
approximate the possibility of imprisonment and make the choice
a difficult one. In Sanney, on the other hand, the court found the
value of his lost wages, the consequence of exercising his right to
remain silent, to be substantially less. There were no pension or
other benefits to be forfeited, and the job itself paid relatively low
wages. The court may have viewed this choice to have been an easy
one-Sanney would be foolish to pay the price of possible imprisonment to try to retain a menial, low-paying job. Yet he did just that.
The choice of job over imprisonment could only be voluntary: it
could not have been coerced.
A marketplace analysis, however, fails to take into account
subjective factors that courts have often considered in cases of
claimed coercion or involuntariness. 31 If the court had wished to rest
its conclusion on the "time" factor alone-that Sanney's job was
37
only "two days old"-its result would have been more palatable.
The Garrity line of cases could have been distinguished on the basis
of benefits accrued, reliance on future benefits, and job security.
34. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
35. 500 F.2d at 415.
36. The Court has looked to subjective factors in deciding that a defendant's "will was
overborne" in giving a confession. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), the Court found
that the defendant, a foreign-born young man with one-half year of high school education, a
history of emotional instability, and no prior law violation or subjection to official interrogation, had been subjected to "official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely aroused." Id. at
323. In Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), the Court again pointed to the defendant's youth,
his lack of prior experience with the police, as well as his subnormal intelligence, finding that
he had been weakened by illness, pain, and lack of food prior to his confession.
37. The dissent, however, would not agree with a decision resting on the time factor alone
and omitting any reference to the meniality of Sanney's job. First, without reference to the
time invested in a job, many people work their entire lives without accruing pension or other
benefits. Secondly, differentiation of jobs on the basis of the length of time at work would
force the courts to make ad hoc decisions as to what tenure is "long enough" to invoke
Garrity's protective rule. Justice Feinberg would therefore reject the notion that a recent
discharge must necessarily be an insubstantial loss. 500 F.2d at 417.
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Instead, the court linked this factor with another-the kind of job
at stake-deciding that a menial job of driver's assistant was somehow of less value than the policeman's, lawyer's, or architect's. 8 In
terms of the objective value of earning capacity, that may be true.
But the test to be employed here is not a purely objective one inquiring into the value of the job to some hypothetical person. The question to be answered is whether the threat of the loss of this job could
have coerced this particular person into giving up his right to remain
silent in order to keep it. To decide that question something more
than a purely objective or marketplace standard must be used.
It may be more accurate to say that the court attempted to apply
a more subjective standard but failed. By looking at the kind of job
involved and to Sanney's transience, for example, the court may
have been trying to assess the impact of the loss on him. It failed,
however, to articulate its standard. We have no idea what "transience" the court had in mind. If a frequent job change, for example,
were due to factors beyond his control, such as illness, rather than
due to a freely exercised right to terminate, the impact of this job
loss on him could have been substantial and the possibility of coercion greater. 9
After Sanney, the state may not circumvent a person's right to
remain silent by using a private employer to elicit confessions by
threatening the employee's job. But the Second Circuit has left open
the question of the kind of job which, when threatened, would be a
substantial enough economic loss to render a confession involuntary. Police and private employers are given no guidance as to when
their actions will overstep the bounds of the fifth amendment. They
are assured, however, that where the defendant does not have a job
38. The court, however, denied that its decision was based on the "meniality" of Sanney's
job. It asserted that its holding was based on the insubstantiality of the economic sanction
faced by him, a holding which would apply as well to a highly paid businessman with a similar
transient employment history and no assurance of tenure. 500 F.2d at 415-16 n.3. See note
39 infra.
39. That the court may be defining "transience" in terms of job changes due entirely to
factors within the employee's control is suggested by its assertion that the holding would
apply to a "pampered professional or high-paid businessman with a similar transient employment." 500 F.2d at 415-16 n.3. See note 38 supra. If both Sanney and the professional had
the ability to secure a new job the choice between the job and the exercise of the constitutional
right would be easy. They would both choose the right, since another job would be easy to
find. While this may be true in the case of the professional, it may not be true in Sanney's
case. It is this inquiry that the court fails to make-an inquiry into more subjective factors
that could have enabled the court to better assess the coercive effect of his job loss.

Vol. 13: 983

Duquesne Law Review

protected by pension rights, seniority, or perhaps unemployment
compensation, his job and his fifth amendment rights will not be
protected.
Janet L. Zoltanski

CRIMINAL LAW-APPELLATE REVIEW-BASIC

AND FUNDAMENTAL

ERROR-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that allegations of basic and fundamental error will no longer enable appellants in criminal cases to seek reversal for alleged errors not properly
raised in the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272 (Pa. 1974).
Alvin Clair was convicted of murder in the second degree and, on
direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, sought reversal
for error in the trial judge's charge to the jury. Clair contended that
the judge invaded the jury's province, prejudiced him while reviewing the testimony, and erroneously instructed the jury on the law.'
Appellant's counsel did not object at trial to the alleged errors;
nevertheless, Clair claimed the errors were basic and fundamental
and could be reviewed by the court despite the failure to preserve
them below. The court rejected this argument and, overruling precedents on which appellant had relied on appeal, abrogated the
doctrine of basic and fundamental error in criminal cases.2
The Clair court pointed to the difficulty of determining which
errors are basic and fundamental and to the anomalous situation
created: while all reversible error is not basic and fundamental there
is no readily apparent difference between themA Furthermore, the
court noted that in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.,' it had
abrogated the fundamental error doctrine in civil cases. There the
court had reasoned that the doctrine excused inadequate preparation and discouraged alert professional representation, penalized
the opposing party, denied the trial court the opportunity to correct
the error, impaired the finality of trial court holdings and encour1. Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272, 273 (Pa. 1974).
2. Id. at 274. Justice Nix wrote the opinion for the court.
3. Id. at 273.
4. 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).

